1
0
mirror of https://xff.cz/git/u-boot/ synced 2025-08-31 08:12:06 +02:00
Pull request for UEFI sub-system for efi-2020-10-rc3 (2)

This series includes bug fixes for:

* UEFI secure boot - images with multiple signatures
* UEFI secure boot - support for intermediate certificates
* corrections for UEFI unit tests
* missing loadaddr on MAIX board
This commit is contained in:
Tom Rini
2020-08-15 09:01:01 -04:00
12 changed files with 556 additions and 315 deletions

View File

@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT
select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
select PKCS7_VERIFY
default n
help
Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support.

View File

@@ -546,6 +546,11 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
goto err;
}
if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx)) {
EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was found in \"dbx\"\n");
goto err;
}
/*
* go through WIN_CERTIFICATE list
* NOTE:
@@ -553,10 +558,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
* in PE header, or as pkcs7 SignerInfo's in SignedData.
* So the verification policy here is:
* - Success if, at least, one of signatures is verified
* - unless
* any of signatures is rejected explicitly, or
* none of digest algorithms are supported
* - unless signature is rejected explicitly with its digest.
*/
for (wincert = wincerts, wincerts_end = (u8 *)wincerts + wincerts_len;
(u8 *)wincert < wincerts_end;
wincert = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *)
@@ -627,32 +631,29 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size)
/* try black-list first */
if (efi_signature_verify_one(regs, msg, dbx)) {
EFI_PRINT("Signature was rejected by \"dbx\"\n");
goto err;
continue;
}
if (!efi_signature_check_signers(msg, dbx)) {
EFI_PRINT("Signer(s) in \"dbx\"\n");
goto err;
}
if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, dbx)) {
EFI_PRINT("Image's digest was found in \"dbx\"\n");
goto err;
continue;
}
/* try white-list */
if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, msg, db, dbx))
continue;
if (efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, db, dbx)) {
ret = true;
break;
}
debug("Signature was not verified by \"db\"\n");
if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db))
continue;
if (efi_signature_lookup_digest(regs, db)) {
ret = true;
break;
}
debug("Image's digest was not found in \"db\" or \"dbx\"\n");
goto err;
}
ret = true;
err:
efi_sigstore_free(db);

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,9 @@
#include <image.h>
#include <hexdump.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7_parser.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <u-boot/rsa.h>
@@ -60,143 +62,6 @@ static bool efi_hash_regions(struct image_region *regs, int count,
return true;
}
/**
* efi_hash_msg_content - calculate a hash value of contentInfo
* @msg: Signature
* @hash: Pointer to a pointer to buffer holding a hash value
* @size: Size of buffer to be returned
*
* Calculate a sha256 value of contentInfo in @msg and return a value in @hash.
*
* Return: true on success, false on error
*/
static bool efi_hash_msg_content(struct pkcs7_message *msg, void **hash,
size_t *size)
{
struct image_region regtmp;
regtmp.data = msg->data;
regtmp.size = msg->data_len;
return efi_hash_regions(&regtmp, 1, hash, size);
}
/**
* efi_signature_verify - verify a signature with a certificate
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
* @signed_info: Pointer to PKCS7's signed_info
* @cert: x509 certificate
*
* Signature pointed to by @signed_info against image pointed to by @regs
* is verified by a certificate pointed to by @cert.
* @signed_info holds a signature, including a message digest which is to be
* compared with a hash value calculated from @regs.
*
* Return: true if signature is verified, false if not
*/
static bool efi_signature_verify(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct pkcs7_message *msg,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *ps_info,
struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
struct image_sign_info info;
struct image_region regtmp[2];
void *hash;
size_t size;
char c;
bool verified;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p(issuer: %s, subject: %s)\n", __func__,
regs, ps_info, cert, cert->issuer, cert->subject);
verified = false;
memset(&info, '\0', sizeof(info));
info.padding = image_get_padding_algo("pkcs-1.5");
/*
* Note: image_get_[checksum|crypto]_algo takes an string
* argument like "<checksum>,<crypto>"
* TODO: support other hash algorithms
*/
if (!strcmp(ps_info->sig->hash_algo, "sha1")) {
info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha1,rsa2048");
info.name = "sha1,rsa2048";
} else if (!strcmp(ps_info->sig->hash_algo, "sha256")) {
info.checksum = image_get_checksum_algo("sha256,rsa2048");
info.name = "sha256,rsa2048";
} else {
EFI_PRINT("unknown msg digest algo: %s\n",
ps_info->sig->hash_algo);
goto out;
}
info.crypto = image_get_crypto_algo(info.name);
info.key = cert->pub->key;
info.keylen = cert->pub->keylen;
/* verify signature */
EFI_PRINT("%s: crypto: %s, signature len:%x\n", __func__,
info.name, ps_info->sig->s_size);
if (ps_info->aa_set & (1UL << sinfo_has_message_digest)) {
EFI_PRINT("%s: RSA verify authentication attribute\n",
__func__);
/*
* NOTE: This path will be executed only for
* PE image authentication
*/
/* check if hash matches digest first */
EFI_PRINT("checking msg digest first, len:0x%x\n",
ps_info->msgdigest_len);
#ifdef DEBUG
EFI_PRINT("hash in database:\n");
print_hex_dump(" ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1,
ps_info->msgdigest, ps_info->msgdigest_len,
false);
#endif
/* against contentInfo first */
hash = NULL;
if ((msg->data && efi_hash_msg_content(msg, &hash, &size)) ||
/* for signed image */
efi_hash_regions(regs->reg, regs->num, &hash, &size)) {
/* for authenticated variable */
if (ps_info->msgdigest_len != size ||
memcmp(hash, ps_info->msgdigest, size)) {
EFI_PRINT("Digest doesn't match\n");
free(hash);
goto out;
}
free(hash);
} else {
EFI_PRINT("Digesting image failed\n");
goto out;
}
/* against digest */
c = 0x31;
regtmp[0].data = &c;
regtmp[0].size = 1;
regtmp[1].data = ps_info->authattrs;
regtmp[1].size = ps_info->authattrs_len;
if (!rsa_verify(&info, regtmp, 2,
ps_info->sig->s, ps_info->sig->s_size))
verified = true;
} else {
EFI_PRINT("%s: RSA verify content data\n", __func__);
/* against all data */
if (!rsa_verify(&info, regs->reg, regs->num,
ps_info->sig->s, ps_info->sig->s_size))
verified = true;
}
out:
EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, verified: %d\n", __func__, verified);
return verified;
}
/**
* efi_signature_lookup_digest - search for an image's digest in sigdb
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
@@ -260,61 +125,129 @@ out:
}
/**
* efi_signature_verify_with_list - verify a signature with signature list
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
* @msg: Signature
* @signed_info: Pointer to PKCS7's signed_info
* @siglist: Signature list for certificates
* @valid_cert: x509 certificate that verifies this signature
* efi_lookup_certificate - find a certificate within db
* @msg: Signature
* @db: Signature database
*
* Signature pointed to by @signed_info against image pointed to by @regs
* is verified by signature list pointed to by @siglist.
* Signature database is a simple concatenation of one or more
* signature list(s).
* Search signature database pointed to by @db and find a certificate
* pointed to by @cert.
*
* Return: true if signature is verified, false if not
* Return: true if found, false otherwise.
*/
static
bool efi_signature_verify_with_list(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct pkcs7_message *msg,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_info,
struct efi_signature_store *siglist,
struct x509_certificate **valid_cert)
static bool efi_lookup_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert,
struct efi_signature_store *db)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert;
struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
struct efi_sig_data *sig_data;
bool verified = false;
struct image_region reg[1];
void *hash = NULL, *hash_tmp = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
bool found = false;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p, %p\n", __func__,
regs, signed_info, siglist, valid_cert);
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p\n", __func__, cert, db);
if (guidcmp(&siglist->sig_type, &efi_guid_cert_x509)) {
EFI_PRINT("Signature type is not supported: %pUl\n",
&siglist->sig_type);
if (!cert || !db || !db->sig_data_list)
goto out;
/*
* TODO: identify a certificate using sha256 digest
* Is there any better way?
*/
/* calculate hash of TBSCertificate */
reg[0].data = cert->tbs;
reg[0].size = cert->tbs_size;
if (!efi_hash_regions(reg, 1, &hash, &size))
goto out;
EFI_PRINT("%s: searching for %s\n", __func__, cert->subject);
for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next) {
/* only with x509 certificate */
if (guidcmp(&siglist->sig_type, &efi_guid_cert_x509))
continue;
for (sig_data = siglist->sig_data_list; sig_data;
sig_data = sig_data->next) {
struct x509_certificate *cert_tmp;
cert_tmp = x509_cert_parse(sig_data->data,
sig_data->size);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cert_tmp))
continue;
EFI_PRINT("%s: against %s\n", __func__,
cert_tmp->subject);
reg[0].data = cert_tmp->tbs;
reg[0].size = cert_tmp->tbs_size;
if (!efi_hash_regions(reg, 1, &hash_tmp, NULL))
goto out;
x509_free_certificate(cert_tmp);
if (!memcmp(hash, hash_tmp, size)) {
found = true;
goto out;
}
}
}
out:
free(hash);
free(hash_tmp);
/* go through the list */
for (sig_data = siglist->sig_data_list; sig_data;
sig_data = sig_data->next) {
/* TODO: support owner check based on policy */
EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, found: %d\n", __func__, found);
return found;
}
cert = x509_cert_parse(sig_data->data, sig_data->size);
if (IS_ERR(cert)) {
EFI_PRINT("Parsing x509 certificate failed\n");
goto out;
/**
* efi_verify_certificate - verify certificate's signature with database
* @signer: Certificate
* @db: Signature database
* @root: Certificate to verify @signer
*
* Determine if certificate pointed to by @signer may be verified
* by one of certificates in signature database pointed to by @db.
*
* Return: true if certificate is verified, false otherwise.
*/
static bool efi_verify_certificate(struct x509_certificate *signer,
struct efi_signature_store *db,
struct x509_certificate **root)
{
struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
struct efi_sig_data *sig_data;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
bool verified = false;
int ret;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p\n", __func__, signer, db);
if (!signer || !db || !db->sig_data_list)
goto out;
for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next) {
/* only with x509 certificate */
if (guidcmp(&siglist->sig_type, &efi_guid_cert_x509))
continue;
for (sig_data = siglist->sig_data_list; sig_data;
sig_data = sig_data->next) {
cert = x509_cert_parse(sig_data->data, sig_data->size);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cert)) {
EFI_PRINT("Cannot parse x509 certificate\n");
continue;
}
ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub,
signer->sig);
if (!ret) {
verified = true;
if (root)
*root = cert;
else
x509_free_certificate(cert);
goto out;
}
x509_free_certificate(cert);
}
verified = efi_signature_verify(regs, msg, signed_info, cert);
if (verified) {
if (valid_cert)
*valid_cert = cert;
else
x509_free_certificate(cert);
break;
}
x509_free_certificate(cert);
}
out:
@@ -335,7 +268,7 @@ out:
* protocol at this time and any image will be unconditionally revoked
* when this match occurs.
*
* Return: true if check passed, false otherwise.
* Return: true if check passed (not found), false otherwise.
*/
static bool efi_signature_check_revocation(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
struct x509_certificate *cert,
@@ -405,56 +338,8 @@ out:
return !revoked;
}
/**
* efi_signature_verify_one - verify signatures with database
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
* @msg: Signature
* @db: Signature database
*
* All the signature pointed to by @msg against image pointed to by @regs
* will be verified by signature database pointed to by @db.
*
* Return: true if verification for one of signatures passed, false
* otherwise
*/
bool efi_signature_verify_one(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct pkcs7_message *msg,
struct efi_signature_store *db)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
bool verified = false;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p\n", __func__, regs, msg, db);
if (!db)
goto out;
if (!db->sig_data_list)
goto out;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Verify signed image with db\n", __func__);
for (sinfo = msg->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
EFI_PRINT("Signed Info: digest algo: %s, pkey algo: %s\n",
sinfo->sig->hash_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo);
for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next)
if (efi_signature_verify_with_list(regs, msg, sinfo,
siglist, &cert)) {
verified = true;
goto out;
}
EFI_PRINT("Valid certificate not in \"db\"\n");
}
out:
EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, verified: %d\n", __func__, verified);
return verified;
}
/**
* efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb - verify signatures with db and dbx
/*
* efi_signature_verify - verify signatures with db and dbx
* @regs: List of regions to be authenticated
* @msg: Signature
* @db: Signature database for trusted certificates
@@ -465,43 +350,71 @@ out:
*
* Return: true if verification for all signatures passed, false otherwise
*/
bool efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct pkcs7_message *msg,
struct efi_signature_store *db,
struct efi_signature_store *dbx)
bool efi_signature_verify(struct efi_image_regions *regs,
struct pkcs7_message *msg,
struct efi_signature_store *db,
struct efi_signature_store *dbx)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *info;
struct efi_signature_store *siglist;
struct x509_certificate *cert;
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *signer, *root;
bool verified = false;
int ret;
EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %p, %p, %p, %p\n", __func__, regs, msg, db, dbx);
if (!regs || !msg || !db || !db->sig_data_list)
goto out;
for (info = msg->signed_infos; info; info = info->next) {
for (sinfo = msg->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
EFI_PRINT("Signed Info: digest algo: %s, pkey algo: %s\n",
info->sig->hash_algo, info->sig->pkey_algo);
sinfo->sig->hash_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo);
for (siglist = db; siglist; siglist = siglist->next) {
if (efi_signature_verify_with_list(regs, msg, info,
siglist, &cert))
break;
}
if (!siglist) {
EFI_PRINT("Valid certificate not in \"db\"\n");
/*
* only for authenticated variable.
*
* If this function is called for image,
* hash calculation will be done in
* pkcs7_verify_one().
*/
if (!msg->data &&
!efi_hash_regions(regs->reg, regs->num,
(void **)&sinfo->sig->digest, NULL)) {
EFI_PRINT("Digesting an image failed\n");
goto out;
}
if (!dbx || efi_signature_check_revocation(info, cert, dbx))
EFI_PRINT("Verifying certificate chain\n");
signer = NULL;
ret = pkcs7_verify_one(msg, sinfo, &signer);
if (ret == -ENOPKG)
continue;
EFI_PRINT("Certificate in \"dbx\"\n");
goto out;
}
verified = true;
if (ret < 0 || !signer)
goto out;
if (sinfo->blacklisted)
goto out;
EFI_PRINT("Verifying last certificate in chain\n");
if (signer->self_signed) {
if (efi_lookup_certificate(signer, db))
if (efi_signature_check_revocation(sinfo,
signer, dbx))
break;
} else if (efi_verify_certificate(signer, db, &root)) {
bool check;
check = efi_signature_check_revocation(sinfo, root,
dbx);
x509_free_certificate(root);
if (check)
break;
}
EFI_PRINT("Certificate chain didn't reach trusted CA\n");
}
if (sinfo)
verified = true;
out:
EFI_PRINT("%s: Exit, verified: %d\n", __func__, verified);
return verified;

View File

@@ -37,16 +37,21 @@ static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = {
* efi_variable_parse_signature - parse a signature in variable
* @buf: Pointer to variable's value
* @buflen: Length of @buf
* @tmpbuf: Pointer to temporary buffer
*
* Parse a signature embedded in variable's value and instantiate
* a pkcs7_message structure. Since pkcs7_parse_message() accepts only
* pkcs7's signedData, some header needed be prepended for correctly
* parsing authentication data, particularly for variable's.
* A temporary buffer will be allocated if needed, and it should be
* kept valid during the authentication because some data in the buffer
* will be referenced by efi_signature_verify().
*
* Return: Pointer to pkcs7_message structure on success, NULL on error
*/
static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
size_t buflen)
size_t buflen,
u8 **tmpbuf)
{
u8 *ebuf;
size_t ebuflen, len;
@@ -59,7 +64,9 @@ static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
if (buflen > sizeof(pkcs7_hdr) &&
!memcmp(&((u8 *)buf)[4], &pkcs7_hdr[4], 11)) {
msg = pkcs7_parse_message(buf, buflen);
goto out;
if (IS_ERR(msg))
return NULL;
return msg;
}
/*
@@ -94,12 +101,12 @@ static struct pkcs7_message *efi_variable_parse_signature(const void *buf,
msg = pkcs7_parse_message(ebuf, ebuflen);
free(ebuf);
out:
if (IS_ERR(msg))
if (IS_ERR(msg)) {
free(ebuf);
return NULL;
}
*tmpbuf = ebuf;
return msg;
}
@@ -136,6 +143,7 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
struct efi_time timestamp;
struct rtc_time tm;
u64 new_time;
u8 *ebuf;
enum efi_auth_var_type var_type;
efi_status_t ret;
@@ -143,6 +151,7 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
truststore = NULL;
truststore2 = NULL;
regs = NULL;
ebuf = NULL;
ret = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
if (*data_size < sizeof(struct efi_variable_authentication_2))
@@ -204,9 +213,12 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
/* variable's signature list */
if (auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength < sizeof(auth->auth_info))
goto err;
/* ebuf should be kept valid during the authentication */
var_sig = efi_variable_parse_signature(auth->auth_info.cert_data,
auth->auth_info.hdr.dwLength
- sizeof(auth->auth_info));
- sizeof(auth->auth_info),
&ebuf);
if (!var_sig) {
EFI_PRINT("Parsing variable's signature failed\n");
goto err;
@@ -241,12 +253,11 @@ static efi_status_t efi_variable_authenticate(u16 *variable,
}
/* verify signature */
if (efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, var_sig, truststore, NULL)) {
if (efi_signature_verify(regs, var_sig, truststore, NULL)) {
EFI_PRINT("Verified\n");
} else {
if (truststore2 &&
efi_signature_verify_with_sigdb(regs, var_sig,
truststore2, NULL)) {
efi_signature_verify(regs, var_sig, truststore2, NULL)) {
EFI_PRINT("Verified\n");
} else {
EFI_PRINT("Verifying variable's signature failed\n");
@@ -262,6 +273,7 @@ err:
efi_sigstore_free(truststore);
efi_sigstore_free(truststore2);
pkcs7_free_message(var_sig);
free(ebuf);
free(regs);
return ret;
@@ -496,10 +508,6 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
return ret;
ret = efi_init_secure_state();
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
return ret;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_VARIABLES_PRESEED)) {
ret = efi_var_restore((struct efi_var_file *)
__efi_var_file_begin);
@@ -507,5 +515,9 @@ efi_status_t efi_init_variables(void)
log_err("Invalid EFI variable seed\n");
}
return efi_var_from_file();
ret = efi_var_from_file();
if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS)
return ret;
return efi_init_secure_state();
}